An unexpected contact on LinkedIn. A proposal of employment from a headhunter, most likely a young woman, operating from China. The opportunity to earn around £20,000 on the side preparing a small number of geopolitical analyses for a firm from China containing “non-public” or privileged insights. Compensation in digital currency or physical money preferred.
It may seem obvious, on this telling, that an element about this approach would be amiss. Nevertheless, Beijing's influential Ministry of State Security still considers it valuable to deploy recruitment consultants to try it – leading MI5 to warn repeatedly about their operations on the internet.
Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum said Chinese agents were approaching UK citizens on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a frequency of ten thousand over the previous 30-month period, seeking political, commercial, military and scientific classified information. However a new campaign aimed at elected officials and Westminster has led the spy agency to take further action.
An espionage alert was distributed on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to reach out to Members of Parliament, lords, their staffers, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might become a source.
Security Strategy and Legislative Changes
In the curious manner of British intelligence, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the interior ministry. Yet the agency was aware its briefing note would become public once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Sharing it in the press helps the wider public more easily recognize interactions with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the effect of flushing out additional details from within parliament, although that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The agency wants public figures to recognize that simply because interactions on professional networks are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are without risk.
Nor is domestic spy agency understood to have been responding to any specific incident in parliament, though the recent actions occur after the awkward failure of the prosecution of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his friend Christopher Berry on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of working for China – a charge they rejected – but failure to successfully conclude a trial under the since replaced previous legislation resulted in warnings that British democracy had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Laws and China's Long-Term Interests
The law has now been changed, and the security briefing contains a reminder of its successor: “Individuals involved in espionage activity risk significant criminal penalties under the new security law.” This constitutes a crime if a person participates in behavior that could potentially “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious inquiry, however, is what China has to gain. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted knowledge of classified material, and an associate of theirs less so. Yet the Chinese government is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a period, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s China policy on issues such as Huawei or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being driven by MPs.
Methodological Variations and Persistent Digital Risks
In part there are cultural differences as well. Authoritarian governments like China’s export information gathering techniques and the size of its intelligence apparatus is vast, employing three hundred thousand people. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was occasionally assessed that “China have more English speakers involved in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is prepared to cultivate contacts over the extended period and sometimes even the agencies have struggled to differentiate genuine connections and spying. “China has a low threshold for which details is considered to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis informed parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may mean someone rapidly peripheral becomes significant.
An alternative perspective to think about the relentless efforts at secret intelligence collection is in the wider context of the international competition between Beijing and the Western nations at a threshold under the point of direct conflict. The nation has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of phone and data networks in numerous nations, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of countless internet devices.
Chinese authorities is engaged in persistent efforts to find secret informants on UK politics via digital means because it seeks to be challenging, to display power and because it has the capability.
